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Abstract
Corruption involves a wide range of activities, which, it is argued, undermine a country’s
prosperity. Many scholars suggest that corruption lowers economic growth. Counterarguments,
however, have been put forth that suggest corruption either fosters growth and development or
has no significant effect on economic performance. Clearly, there is no consensus in the
economics literature on the relationship, if any, between corruption and growth. One of the
challenges of investigating the impact of corruption on an economy stems from its complex and
secretive nature that makes it both difficult to define and hard to measure. In an effort to enter
the ongoing debate, this study examines the effects of corruption on economic growth in the
region of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) by using the Transparency International
Corruption Perceptions Index and employing two panel data on the North African and Gulf
countries between 2003 and 2013. These regions are chosen because they are understudies in the
economic literature and although the World Bank has recently focused on corruption in the
developing world, very little attention has been paid to the MENA countries. The findings of
both samples suggest a negative but statistically insignificant relationship between the observed
countries’ economic growth and the level of corruption.
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1. Introduction

Brief History of Corruption
From embezzlement scandals in the Philippines and money-laundering investigations in
in Brazil to the recent Panama papers leaks, corruption manages to surface as a worldwide topic
of interest. The word itself, corruption, is derived from the Latin word “corrumpere” which
means to destroy and spoil. The term was first coined by Greek philosophers who discussed
corruption within the realm of politics and governmental power. Aristotle explained pure forms
of government as those “that govern with a view to the common interest” versus corrupt forms
“that rule with a view to the private interest” (Wallis, 2006, 23). He argued that corruption was a
phase of decay, almost inevitable in a constitution’s cycle of growth. Polybius related corruption
to an imbalance in the constitutional structure of the government and further developed
Aristotle’s two forms of government into six types: kingship, aristocracy and democracy as the
pure forms, and despotism, oligarchy and mob-rule as the allied forms. He argued that the
process through which governments evolve from one form into another is corruption; thus, it is a
needed force in unmixed governments. The philosopher also mentioned that the prevention of
corruption includes having a balanced government consisting of its three pure forms to create a
mixed power (Wallis, 2006, 29).
Exploring the origins of corruption, we discover that is in fact not a new phenomenon.
During the second century BCE, the Indian philosopher and royal advisor Kautilya discussed
corruption in the Hindu treatise “The Arthashastra.” He recognized different ways to embezzle
government funds in preventing good governance, and argued that corruption cannot be perfectly
scrutinized (Tanzi, 1998, 4). During the thirteenth century, the Italian poet Dante Aligheri
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attacked the corruption he observed within the church of Rome in his book the “Inferno.”
Another example involves Shakespeare’s Hamlet which discusses the corrupt state of Denmark,
portrayed by a disease. However, and despite the prevalence of this topic throughout history and
prominent literature, it did not gain international attention until the end of the twentieth century.
International Institutions, such as the World Bank, initially considered corruption as a
political problem, which prevented the Group from attempting to address it. As per Article IV,
section 10, of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s (IBRD)1 Articles of
Agreement, the Bank and its officers “shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member
(IBRD Articles of Agreement Article IV, 2012).” However, in 1996, the then president of the
world bank Wolfenshohn directly acknowledged corruption as a social and economic issue, in
the Bank’s focus to target economic and financial efficiency “we also need to address
transparency, accountability, and institutional capacity. And let's not mince words: we need to
deal with the cancer of corruption” (The World Bank, 1996). This marked the beginning of a
new paradigm where corruption took place front and center in an international debate regarding
prevention and elimination of corrupt behavior. Corruption was determined to distribute a
country’s resources to the higher social classes, at the expense of the poor, as well as divert
public expenditures and hinder foreign investment. Thus, the recognition of the role of
corruption as a barrier to an equitable development relates to the World Bank’s two main goals,
which are to reduce extreme poverty and to promote greater equity in the developing world.
Since then, the World Bank has contributed to advise and implement over 600 anti-corruption
programs throughout the world. In Nigeria, the government established the Extractive Industries

1

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development is one of the two institutions constituting
the World Bank, with the other one being the International Development Association.
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Transparency Initiative to audit the oil sector which resulted in recovering over $2.4 billion of
lost revenue. Another example involves the Indian government, which allocated smartcards in a
nationwide biometric identification system to lower wrongdoings in welfare programs and
ensure that the poor receive their needed payments. Moreover in 1995, Transparency
International launched its corruption perceptions index which was a significant step in the battle
against corruption since it allowed to provide data on the topic that was previously more limited.
Additionally, the United Nations established the United Nations Convention against Corruption
in 2003 as a legally binding international instrument to mainly enhance transparency as a
preventive measure as well as criminalize corrupt behaviors as a law enforcement measure.
Consistent with the Bank’s mission to fight corruption, World Bank Group President Jim
Yong Kim announced in 2013 that corruption is public enemy number one in developing
countries. He explained that “every dollar that a corrupt official or a corrupt business person
puts in their pocket is a dollar stolen from a pregnant woman who needs health care; or from a
girl or a boy who deserves an education; or from communities that need water, roads, and
schools. Every dollar is critical if we are to reach our goals to end extreme poverty by 2030 and
to boost shared prosperity” (The World Bank, 2013).
Considering its impact on poverty and foreign investment, corruption became linked
negatively to economic growth. In fact, a USAID opinion poll survey found that the median
respondent thinks that “60 percent of aid ends up in the hands of corrupt officials”, while the
Department for International Development in the United Kingdom found that “57 percent of the
population reckons that giving aid is pointless because of the level of corruption” (Kenny, 2014).
And yet, corruption may not be seen as the main problem in the developing world. In a World
Bank survey, companies are given 15 possible answer choices, ranging from access to finance to
7

regulations, infrastructure, tax rates, crime, and corruption to answer “What’s the most serious
obstacle facing the operation of this establishment?”, and the surprising finding is that in less
than 1 percent of countries was “corruption” the most common answer. Hence, the question is
whether corruption is indeed a hindering factor to foreign investment and consequently economic
growth, since it does not seem to be a priority concern for entrepreneurs.
Purpose and Outline
This thesis examines the relationship between corruption and economic growth in the
Middle East and North Africa, in order to determine if corruption is indeed a significant factor in
reducing growth. The empirical analysis explores the Middle East and North Africa region,
excluding several countries such as Syria and Iraq due to data limitations. The remaining
countries are divided into two sub-samples: the Gulf sub sample consisting of seven countries:
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen, and the North
Africa sub-sample consisting of 6 countries: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and
Tunisia. These two regions are respectively based on the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the 2001
Arab spring; these two events allowed to group the selected countries into two sub-samples to
further reduce the differences within the MENA region such as the countries’ various income
and corruption levels. Furthermore, the study covers the years between 2003 and 2013. It
includes two panel data as well as unit root tests and cointegration analysis, to test for a stable
long-run economic structure between the variables in question.
The following chapters are structured as follows: chapter two offers a review of the
literature on corruption. It discusses the mechanisms through which corruption can affect
economic growth, and presents a brief summary of the empirical work to date on the different
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types of relationship found between the two main variables in question. This chapter also
presents a brief history of the MENA region as well as the findings of two previous empirical
studies pertaining to the examined countries and our research question. Chapter three presents
the conceptual framework and the empirical methodology this study follows. Chapter four
discusses the econometric analysis implemented to estimate the model, as well as the empirical
results. The final chapter presents the concluding remarks and discusses the limitations of this
study.

9

2. Literature Review
This chapter discusses the extensive economic literature on corruption and growth. Corruption is
generally perceived as detrimental to economic growth by deterring investment and undermining
the government’s ability to implement effective policies. However, a significant number of
studies indicate that corruption actually promotes growth based on its role in increasing public
officials’ productivity and speeding up bureaucratic delays. Still, others found that there is no
significant relationship between the two variables. Thus, the economic literature fails to reach a
consensus on the type of relationship, if any, between corruption and economic growth. The
contradicting dynamics between the two variables in question could be due to a number of
differences among the various studies such as the examined regions, independent variables
specified in the model, data sources, specific time frames and/or the controversies regarding the
actual definition of corruption and its measurement. This chapter first explores the evolution of
the definition of corruption as well as the various ways to quantitatively measure its activities.
Then, it discusses the three theories explaining the types of relationship between corruption and
economic growth, followed by a discussion of empirical studies supporting these hypotheses.
Lastly, we take a closer look at the MENA region regarding the history of corruption in the
region, followed by an analysis of the two previous studies which attempted to answer our same
research question.
Definitions and Measurement of Corruption
Most definitions of corruption tend to be a variation of the more general definition found
in most articles: the misuse of public office for private gain. This definition fits into the principalagent framework where the agents (those who perform tasks) collect benefits at the expense of

10

their principals (those on whose behalf the tasks are performed) (Leruth and Paul, 2006).
According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, corruption means “dishonest or illegal behavior
especially by powerful people, such as government officials or police officers.” The relevant
literature provides ample definitions of corruption. Edward Van Roy in Theory of Corruption
(1970) employs the definition of corruption as stated by the Dictionary of Social Sciences as “the
use of... power for.., .profit, preferment, or prestige, or for the benefit of a group or class, in a
way that constitutes a breach of law or of standards of high moral conduct” (1964:142). Of the
earlier definitions, Nye (1967) describes corruption as “behavior which deviates from the formal
duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique)
pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of privateregarding influence.” Waterbury (1973) provides a similar but more succinct definition, as “the
abuse of public power and influence for private ends.”
Alam (1989) offers a new insight on the definition of corruption regarding the
interactions between the agents and the clients. He states that corruption is “(1) the sacrifice of
the principal’s interest for the agent’s, or (2) the violation of norms defining the agent’s
behavior.” More recently, Kaufmann and Vicente (2005:3) discuss legal forms of corruption, and
define it as a “collusive agreement between a part of the agents of the economy who, as a
consequence, are able to swap (over time; we present a repeated game) in terms of positions of
power (i.e. are able to capture, together, the allocation process of the economy).” And finally,
based on what the substantial literature has previously stated, Senior (2006:27) provides a
condensed definition of corruption. He explains the five simultaneous conditions for corruption
to occur: “when a corruptor (1) covertly gives (2) a favour to a corruptee or to a nominee to
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influence (3) action(s) that (4) benefit the corruptor or a nominee, and for which the corruptee
has (5) authority.”
Recent anti-corruption initiatives, however, have examined this phenomenon as a
collective action problem rather than a principal-agent issue. This means that tackling corruption
requires significant and comprehensive efforts. This approach considers an individual’s decision
to engage in corrupt activities depends on other people’s attitudes regarding corruption. If
corruption is perceived as normal or acceptable in a certain environment, then people will be less
likely to participate in anti-corruption reforms. If corruption makes everyone better off, then
people might still get involved in its activities, even if they acknowledge that it is not necessarily
an ordinary behavior.
In addition to corruption being difficult to define, another issue is that it is a difficult
phenomenon to measure due to its secretive and illegal nature. Kaufmann, Krayy and Mastruzzi
(2006:4) argue that “since corruption is clandestine, it is virtually impossible to come up with
precise objective measures of it.” Nonetheless, they identify three ways through which
corruption can be measured:


Audits of specific projects can be useful in finding wrongdoings of those in
charge. This measure is specific to certain projects at a point in time. It does not
indicate the general level of corruption in a country, and would not be
appropriate for cross-sectional comparisons across time.



Institutional features of a country help explain the incentives and opportunities
for potential corruption, but do not measure the actual level of corruption. Thus,
they would not be suitable for a cross-country comparison.
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Surveys of firms, public officials, and individuals, as well as views of outside
observers in NGOs, multilateral donors, and the private sector. These measures
constitute the most appropriate technique for cross-sectional comparisons when
employed in panel data.

One concern may be that surveys are based on people’s perceptions regarding corruption. Since
corrupt activities are mostly not declared and do not leave a paper trail, and their perceptions of
those sharing their real experiences are the closest proxy to measuring corruption thus far. Thus,
perceptions are important in the sense that they impact citizens’ decisions: a citizen who thinks
that a government official is corrupt might opt out of using his/her services in the future, even if
his opinion might not be true. Moreover, subjective data gathered through surveys have become
detailed and quantitative. For example, a question from the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI)2
administered by the World Economic Forum asks “ To what extent is the judiciary in your
country independent from influences of members of government, citizens, or firms?.” The
respondents have to choose a number between 1 and 7, ranging from heavily influenced to
entirely independent, respectively. Another question states “When firms like yours do business
with the government, how much of the contract value must they offer in additional payments to
secure the contract?.” This attempts to value the bribe amounts. However, it is important to note
that no method can produce exact, precise and complete measurements of corruption. Uncertain
and inaccurate results occur for two main reasons: i) measurement errors due to the difficulty to
distinguish between closely related terms in survey questions such as corruption and
incompetence; that is, a respondent might mean to refer to incompetence, but interchangeably

2

The Global Competitiveness Index attempts to quantify the impact of a number of key factors which contribute to create the
conditions for competitiveness, with particular focus on the macroeconomic environment, the quality of the country’s institutions,
and the state of the country’s technology and supporting infrastructure.
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uses the word corruption, even though they indicate different phenomenona, ii) lack of
correlation between various measures of corruption; that is corruption in a certain governmental
project may not be indicative of corruption in the public sector in general.
Despite the inevitable margin of error, informed views and opinions of relevant observers
constitute the most credible and quantitative measure available for otherwise secretive activities.
Kaufmann et al., (2006, 2) mention that perceptions of corruption “are sometimes the best, and
the only, information we have.” Survey questions are also the only source that makes crosscountry comparisons in scale of corruption over a significant period of time, since they form the
only data that cover a large number of countries for a long time frame.
Even though measuring corruption faces empirical challenges, there is an extensive literature
regarding the cause and effect relationships between corruption and economic growth as well as
many empirical studies examining the dynamic between these variables.
Previous Theoretical and Empirical Literature
The Causal Mechanism between Corruption and Economic Growth
The prevalent theory states that corruption reduces economic growth. An example woulf
be Shleifer and Vishny (1993). They employ a principal-agent model, where the principal is the
top level of government and the agent is the corrupt official who accepts bribes from individuals
who wish to obtain a certain good produced by the principal, such as a passport or an import
license. The authors present two types of governmental corruption: corruption without theft,
where the government receives its normal fees and the bureaucrats receive bribes above those
fees, and corruption with theft, where the bureaucrats receive bribes without giving the
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government its fees. In this second type, government officials serve their own self-interests to
the detriment of serving the interests of the government.
The authors explain the two main channels through which corruption hurts growth. First,
a weak governmental system allows the free entry of competing bureaucracies and governmental
agencies, each imposing independent bribes on private agents, which will increase the total
bribes burden, prevent a project from moving forward, and dampen future investments and
growth. Second, the underground nature of corrupt activities distorts the allocation of resources
and investments in a country; as a consequence, resources shift away from high value projects
such as education, to lower value projects, such as defense. This is because corruption can occur
more secretly in the defense sector: educational projects, for example, would require the
collective participation of societies’ members while defense related projects may take place
without the knowledge of citizens or their active participation. Thus, the secrecy of corruption
discourages useful projects and lowers investment and growth. Similarly, Myrdal (1968) argues
that corruption allows government officials to implement deliberate bureaucratic measures, such
as delays to attract more bribes, thus creating bottlenecks to investments which subsequently
reduces growth.
However, other scholars claim that corruption is beneficial to growth. Leff (1964, 8) first
attempted to analyze the relationship between bureaucratic corruption, defined as “an extra-legal
institution used by individuals or groups to gain influence over the actions of the bureaucracy,”
and economic development. He argues that corruption reduces uncertainty and hence, increases
investment. In underdeveloped countries, investors are concerned with the government’s actions,
the unstable political and economic situation, and the usual risk attached to any investment
decision. Thus, bureaucratic corruption encourages investment from potential entrepreneurs by
15

offering a certain guarantee against the often changing, arbitrary government policies. Thus,
investors can better predict the turnout of their endeavors, which will reduce their potential risk
and uncertainty, and increase investment and economic development.
Similarly, Huntington (1968) argues that corruption can be beneficial to growth by
allowing individuals to pay bribes and, thus, bypass the costly bureaucratic administrative system
in place. Lui (1985) develops an equilibrium queuing model of bribery, where customers are
ranked based on their respective values of time. He argues that corruption is an efficient
mechanism which increases the speed of service and allows the arrangement of the waiting line
so that individuals with higher values of time are able to move to the front of the queue. It
follows that potential investors have a higher opportunity cost of time than other people waiting
in line and can afford to pay higher bribes to obtain a certain permit for example; thus, corruption
assists them in avoiding bureaucratic delays. In this process, such unproductive activities which
the full utilization of a company’s potential profits can be reduced, thus leading to enhancing
growth overall.
Acemoglu and Verdier (1998) examine an economy focused on contracts (a source of
investment) between private agents, where the state has a crucial role in enforcing these property
rights and their allocational roles. In this scenario, corruption can cause a public official to
abandon objective criteria and side unfairly with one of the contract’s parties. In this case,
property rights won’t be suitably enforced. They create a model consisting of an infinite number
of agents who are either an entrepreneur or a bureaucrat. Following a series of cases, the authors
argue that corruption is too costly to prevent altogether and that it is optimal to allow some level
of corruption and not fully enforce property rights. In fact, the purpose of contract enforcement is
to redistribute the profits from an investment project based on previously agreed upon pacts.
16

However, this argument assumes that, after the end of the project, there will be incentives to
“violate these property rights, and the rents for the government employees are necessary in order
to prevent such violations (corruption)” (Acemoglu and Verdier, 1998, 1395). Thus, rents in one
public sector increase the cost of property rights enforcement and distort the allocation of talent,
which leads to the trade-off balance between these variables. A certain level of corruption is thus
beneficial, in a way which increases investments and enhances the allocation of talent.
Empirical Studies on the Corruption-Growth Relationship
The vast majority of empirical studies suggest that corruption is harmful to economic
growth. Considering the difficulty in measuring corruption, and thus the lack of data, empirical
studies investigating the effect of this variable are fairly recent. Mauro (1995) was one of the
pioneers who empirically demonstrated the negative impact of corruption on growth, employing
a cross sectional panel data consisting of 70 selected countries around the world for the period
1980 to 1983. He finds that corruption lowers private investment, and thus aggregate growth.
Moreover, he finds that the bureaucratic efficiency index3 is negatively correlated with
investment and growth. Bad institutions cause low growth through lowering investment, and vice
versa: bureaucratic efficiency causes high investment and thus growth. However, Svensson
(2005) updates Mauro’s work on the same sample of countries and runs the calculations again
covering the period between 1982 and 2000. He finds that the coefficient on corruption is indeed
negative but statistically insignificant, concluding that “to the extent we can measure corruption

3

Mauro combined three indices: red tape, corruption and judiciary system into one composite index called
bureaucratic efficiency. He argued that due to the measurement errors in each individual index, the averaged
composite index would provide better results regarding investment and growth, than the corruption index alone. A
high value of the composite index indicates higher corruption; thus, a high index value would lead to lower
investment.
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in a cross-country setting, it does not affect growth” (Svensson, 2005, 39). Mo (2001) uses a
panel data of 46 countries, similar to those used in Mauro’s study, between 1970 and 1985 to
study the quantitative role of corruption in economic growth. He finds that political instability is
the main channel through which corruption negatively impacts growth: since corruption distorts
resources and leads to increased inequality and decreased productivity growth, it creates a
sociopolitical unstable environment. He also finds that corruption impacts growth through other
channels such as the reduction of human capital, and the share of private investment.
On the other hand, there are empirical studies which report the positive impact of
corruption on growth. Egger and Winner (2005) employ a panel data of 73 countries between
1995 and 1999 and find a positive relationship between corruption and foreign direct investment
(FDI). The authors argue that corruption can help circumvent bureaucratic delays and thus is a
stimulus for FDI, from which government officials reap a portion of the profits.
A third group of scholars finds little empirical impact of corruption on economic growth.
Abed and Davoodi (2002) consider corruption to be a symptom of weak institutions within
transitional economies. They examine 25 such countries for the period between 1994 and 1998 to
test their hypothesis that “structural reforms are statistically and economically more significant in
explaining economic performance” (Abed and Davoodi, 2002, 15). They argue that the
explanatory power of corruption, when measured against that of structural reforms, is
insignificant. The authors regress per capita FDI (in U.S. dollars per capita) against the
corruption index, the structural reform index and four control variables including the natural
resource wealth, the initial wage inflation, the initial secondary enrollment rate, and the
population. First, they estimate the regression only including one of the indices, along with the
other explanatory variables. Both variables are significant when they are estimated separately.
18

However, when both are included in the model, the corruption index becomes insignificant. This
finding suggests that “structural reforms are more important than reduced corruption in attracting
foreign direct investment” (Abed and Davoodi, 2000, 33). Thus, structural reforms4 are
statistically more significant in explaining the variation in macroeconomic indicators such as
growth. Similarly, Drury, Kriechkaus and Lustig (2006) employ a panel data of over 100
countries between 1982 and 1997. They reconceptualize the relationship between corruption
and growth by introducing democracy into the equation: the corruption variable is interacted
with a democracy composite index5 to test the role of the latter on economic growth. The
findings suggest that, while non-democracies tend to suffer from the negative impact
of corruption, democratic regimes mitigate the ill effects of corruption on economic
growth. A democratic electoral system allows citizens to periodically remove corrupt leaders
from positions of power, thereby lowering the level of corruption. This mechanism does not
guarantee that democracies are corruption free; in fact, many democratic regimes still exhibit a
high level of corruption, but it is not related to growth-impairing activities. First, in democracies,
as opposed to authoritarian regimes, the press has a significant level of freedom to discuss and
publish about growth-impairing activities, thus limiting their proliferation. Second, the judiciary
has greater independence in democracies, which provides more scrutiny to the composition of
corruption and thus reduces its growth-impairing activities. Third, political institutions in

4

Structural reforms: rationalization of state functions, reliance on market-based pricing, and establishment of a
sound regulatory environment (Abed and Davoodi, 39)
5
Democracy index is created by combining 3 indices of democracy:
-Polity IV data: measures the level of democracy and autocracy in a country and creates an overall score ranging
from -10 to 10.
-Freedom House: measures a country’s political and civil liberties and creates an index ranging from 2 to 14 (a
lower score means more democracy)
-Alvarez et al. (1996): democracy index which classifies countries as either democratic or not. A country is
considered democratic if: the chief executive is elected, the legislature is elected, and there is more than one party.
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democracies tend to restrict politicians’ individual actions and their potential participation in
growth-impairing corruption.

We find that most literature on the corruption-growth relationship focuses on a large
selection of countries, or smaller groups which do not include the Middle East and North Africa
region. Thus, in order to study this relationship, we chose to restrict our analysis to the MENA
region, in an effort to limit variations between countries in a large selected group, which might
generate inconsistent estimates. Moreover, the region is understudied as there has only been a
few empirical analyses regarding this subject. The MENA has recently been attracting
international attention mainly due to a stagnant economic situation and political events, where
the fight against corruption was a main factor in the uprising.

MENA: Background and Previous Studies
Historical Background
The modern history of the Middle East begins in the early 16th century, when the
Ottoman Empire was at its peak, extending east into Persia, south into Mecca, and as far west as
Vienna. The Empire also controlled Egypt and some parts of North Africa. Over the next three
centuries, the Ottoman Empire would decline in power, because of its unpopular rule and the
increased interest of European powers in the region. By 1912, the Ottoman Empire had lost
control of the Persian Gulf to the British, the French had gained influence over the Levant, and
the Italians had seized Libya and the Dodecanese islands. The Ottoman Empire eventually
collapsed by the end of World War I after being defeated by the British forces and Arab
populations in the Sinai and Palestine Campaign. The ottoman dynasty became a Turkish
20

Republic and the Middle East was partitioned between the French and the British in the secret
treaty known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Around the same time, the Bbalfour Declaration
promised the international Zionist movement a Jewish homeland in Palestine.
During the interwar period, the national boundaries of states under the French or the
British mandate were established. Many populations in the Middle East and North Africa took
steps towards independence which was not achieved until the 1940s. The departure of the
European powers, as well as the declaration of the state of Israel in 1948, were turning points in
the history of the Middle East.
The Discovery of oil in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Libya, Algeria, and other states was also a
critical moment. Oil revenues in the post WWII period were at the center of many economies in
the Middle East, and many states experienced tremendous economic growth. In 1979, the Islamic
Revolution in Iran took place, creating an Islamic republic where a secular monarchy once was.
The Revolution affected Arab states and lead to a rise in Islamism.
The most recent turning point occurred in the late 2010s, when the Tunisian Bouazizi set
himself on fire after getting rejected from several jobs. Unemployment rates were extremely low,
political corruption was rampant and inflation was on the rise, which escalated into a contagious
Arab Spring affecting many North African countries. Protesters demanded democratic reform,
social justice, and for corruption and cronyism to be curbed.

Previous Studies
Most of the studies regarding corruption and growth cover regions in the world outside
MENA. However, and to the best of our knowledge, there are two main studies which offer
opposing views concerning the impact of corruption on economic growth in the MENA region.
21

Kutan, Douglas and Judge (2013) find a positive relationship between corruption and economic
development. They run a panel study on sixteen MENA countries6 between 1993 and 2003, and
find that that higher levels of corruption are related to higher levels of GDP pc in these countries.
They argue that corruption plays a beneficial role in many MENA countries, rich in natural
resources, since it helps to circumvent bureaucratic barriers and delays, thus facilitating
investment projects and creating an efficient and desirable business setting. On the other hand,
Hakimi and Hamdi (2015) examine the relationship in question in fifteen MENA countries7.
They find that corruption does in fact hinder economic growth, through lowering investment
activities and foreign direct investment inflows. Furthermore, the detrimental effects of
corruption on economic growth hold up even in the presence of strong governance indicators
such as political stability and rule of law.

6

The selection of country is not specified; we only know that Israel is included in the panel.
15 MENA countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and United Arab Emirates
7
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3. Model Specification

Empirical Model
This thesis bases its conceptual framework on the growth model constructed by Solow
and Swan (1956), where economic growth was examined as a result of capital accumulation and
technological progress. We utilize the following production function, defined as Hicks-Neutral:
Q=A f (K, L)
where Q is output, A is technological progress, and K and L respectively denote capital and
labor.
This function portrays technological progress as an increasing scale factor, which will not be a
point of interest in our study. However, this model is relevant since it confirms the selection of
two of our independent variables as determinants of economic growth: foreign direct investment
as a proxy for capital, and the labor force.
Thus, the empirical model is as follows:
GDP it = β0+ +β1 FDI it + β2 LABOR it + β3 CPI it + β4 GOV it + β5 CPI*FDI it + e it
where GDP (per capita) is a measure of economic growth, FDI is a measure of net inflows of
foreign direct investment a country receives, LABOR is a measure of the labor force, CPI is a
measure of corruption, GOV is a measure of government effectiveness, and CPI*GOV is an
interactive variable combining both corruption and government effectiveness. Also included is
eit, as the error term.
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The subscript i and t indicate that this is a panel study, with i representing each cross sectional
unit, that is each country and t representing each time period, that is each year.
The Middle East and North Africa region is not restricted to one unique standardized
definition or selection of countries. The World Bank includes 20 countries in the MENA region:
Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza, and
Yemen. The majority of those countries (18 Arabic speaking countries) are included in the Arab
League, in addition to Mauritania, Somalia and Sudan. Thus, the most comprehensive sample of
countries within MENA would include 24 countries, including Turkey. For the purposes of this
study, we restrict our analysis to the MENA region defined by Arab League membership.
However, due to data limitations, the initial sample consists of 13 MENA countries: Algeria,
Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, United Arab
Emirates and Yemen, with a time frame between 2003 and 2013.
Considering the wide variation in the level of corruption between these countries, and the
different political events which affected some areas and not others, this sample will be divided
into2 sub-samples:


The gulf region: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and
Yemen. This grouping consists of all countries in the gulf area, which are rich in natural
resources such as petroleum, and have suffered a setback in this field after the 2003
invasion of Iraq, an important source of gas and petroleum in the region.



North Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. These countries
participated in the Arab Spring starting in 2011.
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Each sample will constitute a panel data. This type of econometric modeling allows the grouping
of many cross-sections over many time periods. As Asteriou and Hall (2011, 416) explain, the
combined panel data matrix set “consists of a time series for each cross-sectional member in the
data set and offers a variety of estimation methods.” This analytical method is considered to be
efficient in modeling data (Asteriou and Hall, 2011, 416). It assumes that all cross-sections share
a common set of parameters; thus if this assumption holds, the advantages of panel data include:
i) increasing the sample size which leads to more robust estimates and more information
regarding the data, ii) avoiding the problem of omitted variables which generate biased estimates
in other types of modeling such as individual regressions.
However, panel data must also deal with stationarity and cointegration issues, previously only
discussed in time-series analysis. Thus, this study will employ panel unit root tests, mainly the
Levin, Lin, and Chu (LLC) and the Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) tests on each of the variables.
Additionally, to test for a long term relationship between corruption and economic growth, the
Pedroni methodology as a cointegration test will be performed to examine the relationship in
question. The following chapter will discuss these tests and their results.

Data and Variable Description
Dependent Variable:
Real gross domestic product per capita (constant 2005 US dollars) denoted by GDP is a proxy
for economic growth. Data is from the World Bank database, which defines GDP as “the sum of
gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any
subsidies not included in the value of the products” (World Bank, 2016).
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Independent Variables:
i) Corruptions Perceptions Index (CPI), prepared by Transparency International and is a proxy
for corruption.The index was first launched in 1995 when only 41 countries were covered. By
2015, 177 countries are covered. It calculates an annual score for each country based on how
corrupt its public sector is perceived to be. The score ranges from 0, which means the country is
perceived to be highly corrupt to 10, which means it is perceived to be very clean.
CPI is considered to be “a poll of polls”: Transparency International does not create nor perform
the surveys and assessments in different countries, but rather combines their results from other
institutions in order to create an aggregate corruption indicator for each country.The surveys are
carried out by different independent institutions around the world. Each covers a number of
countries, or a certain region. For a country to be included in the CPI results, it must be included
in the assessment results of at least three of these institutions. To construct the 2013 CPI results,
13 total data sources8 were used. For example, the African Development Bank Governance
Ratings covered all 54 African countries. The analysis is carried out by a group of economists
and local experts in the examined countries. Their assessment targeted the following dimensions:
“the accountability of the executive to oversight institutions and of public employees for their

8

The 13 data sources: African Development Bank Governance Ratings 2012, Bertelsmann Foundation Sustainable
Governance Indicators 2014, Bertelsmann Foundation Transformation Index 2014, Economist Intelligence Unit
Country Risk Ratings, Freedom House Nations in Transit 2013, Global Insight Country Risk Ratings, IMD World
Competitiveness Yearbook 2013, Political and Economic Risk Consultancy Asian Intelligence 2013, Political Risk
Services International Country Risk Guide, Transparency International Bribe Payers Survey 2011, World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 2012, World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey (EOS) 2013,
World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2013
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performance, access of civil society to information on public affairs, and state capture by narrow
vested interests” (Transparency International, 2013), based on which an aggregate score is
created ranging from 1 to 6, where 1 is very weak and 6 is very strong. Other questions are more
specific such as, “to what extent are public officeholders prevented from abusing their position
for private interests?” asked by the Bertelsman Foundation which covers all 41 OECD and EU
countries. Scores range from 1, meaning the highest level of corruption to 10 meaning the
lowest.

ii) Total labor force: the data is from the World Bank Database and it consists of people who
are aged 15 years old and older, who meet the economically active population definition
according to the International Labor Organization, that is, “all people who supply labor for the
population of goods and services during a specific period. It includes both the employed and
unemployed.” (World Bank, 2016)

iii) Foreign Direct Investment: the data is from the World Bank Database and is “the net
inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting
stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of
equity capital, reinvestment earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in
the balance of payments.” (World Bank, 2016) It is included as a percentage of Gross Domestic
Product.

iv) Government Effectiveness: the data is from the World Government Indicators and it
captures “perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the
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degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies”
(Kaufmann et al., 2010). The values of the index range between -2.5 and 2.5, with higher values
associated with better outcomes. This index is constructed by compiling results from various
institutions, with each one covering a certain area of governance. For example, the Economic
Intelligence Unit (EIU) measures the quality of bureaucracy and institutional effectiveness, while
the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report (GCS) deals with infrastructure.

It should be noted that the interactive variable of both corruption and foreign direct
investment is included to test for the role of corruption in the presence of foreign direct
investment on economic growth. All variables, except those in index form, are used in log-linear
specifications to generate a more normal distribution and avoid violating the normality
assumption which leads to obtaining more consistent estimates. Additionally, and due to lack of
data for a few years, we used interpolation to calculate the missing values, by averaging the
previous and following years: for Mauritania, we averaged the CPI variable for 2003 and 2006 to
generate the same value for the years of 2004 and 2005, and for Libya, we averaged the FDI
value for 2010 and 2012 to obtain the 2011 value.
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4. Econometric Analysis

Methodology and Preliminary Results
First, we estimate the following equation using the common constant method, also known as the
basic pooled regression model.
LGDP it = β0+β1 LFDI it-1 + β2 LLABOR it + β3 CPI it + β4 GOV it + β5 LFDI it-1*CPI it +D1+ eit
This estimation assumes that there is one common constant for all cross-sections indicated by β0,
which suggests that the data is homogenous and there are no differences between the estimated
cross-sections. One fixed intercept for all countries implies that the same country is repeated
however many cross-sections there are. However, this case is restrictive and does not apply to
our sub-samples. Even though the countries in each sub-sample are in geographic proximity and
share similarities regarding the political and cultural environment, they still exhibit major
differences such as the size of the economy, or the median income, which does not match the use
of this method. Thus, we perform the Hausman test to choose between the other two methods
mostly used in panel data: the Fixed Effects Model (FEM) or the Random Effects Model (REM)
for each of the sub-samples. This specification test is based on the idea that “under the
hypothesis of no correlation, both OLS and GLS are consistent, but OLS is inefficient, whereas
under the alternative, OLS is consistent, but GLS is not” (Asteriou and Hall, 2011, 420). Thus,
the null hypothesis states that the random effect is appropriate, while the alternative one states
that the fixed effect is appropriate.
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North Africa Subsample:
The random effects model could not be implemented because the number of cross sections does
not exceed the number of coefficients, thus we default to the fixed effects model. This
specification is advantageous in that it does not assume that the coefficients are the same for all
cross-sections, and throughout the time span of the data. It is constant specific, that is it includes
different constants for each cross-section, which do not vary over time, hence the “fixed effect”.
It is portrayed by the following equation, where the intercept β0 includes the subscript i, which
indicates the country particularity.

LGDP it = β0i+β1 LFDI it-1 + β2 LLABOR it + β3 CPI it + β4 GOV it + β5 LFDI it-1*CPI it +D1+ eit
FEM is also known as the Least-Squares Dummy Variable model (LSDV) because it provides a
differential intercept dummy for each cross-section in order to permit each one a different
constant. The following equation explains this model:

LGDP it = α0 + α1D1i + …+ α6D6i+ β1LFDI it-1 + β2 LLABOR it + β3 CPI it + β4GOV it +
Β5 LFDI it-1*CPI it + β6D1+ eit
where D1i = 1 if the observation belongs to Egypt, 0 otherwise; D2i = 1 if the observation belongs
to Libya, 0 otherwise; and so on. We include 6 dummy variables since we have 7 countries, in
order to avoid perfect collinearity. Thus, the first country Algeria was used as a benchmark
(Gujarati, 2011).
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The regression results as shows in Figure 4.1 below indicate that only two coefficients are
significant at the 5% level, and in the expected direction. The labor force has a positive
coefficient since an increase in the economically active population is expected to lead to an
increase in economic growth. The dummy variable is also significant, and has a negative impact
on growth, since a turbulent political situation generally leads to a reduction in investment and
growth. Out main variable of interest, the corruption perceptions index, has a negative sign
suggesting a higher value of the CPI (associated with less corruption) causes a decrease in
economic growth; however the coefficient is not statistically significant at the 5% level. This
result mainly confirms the theory that there is no significant relationship between corruption and
economic growth.
Figure 4.1: FEM regression Output with cross-section weights
Dependent Variable: LGDP_?
Method: Pooled EGLS (Cross-section weights)
Sample (adjusted): 2004 2013
Included observations: 10 after adjustments
Cross-sections included: 6
Total pool (unbalanced) observations: 58
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
LLABOR_?
LFDI_?(-1)
CPI_?
LFDI_?(-1)*CPI_?
GOV_?
D1_?
Fixed Effects
(Cross)
ALGERIA--C
EGYPT--C
LIBYA--C
MAURITANIA--C

-7.093367
0.966009
-0.046890
-0.027655
0.018652
0.039575
-0.013801

1.992740
0.133983
0.059666
0.026855
0.019339
0.046359
0.009791

-3.559605
7.209911
-0.785889
-1.029806
0.964457
0.853671
-1.409488

0.0009
0.0000
0.4360
0.3085
0.3399
0.3977
0.1654

-0.392164
-2.087691
1.972872
0.427129
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MOROCCO--C
TUNISIA--C

-0.828567
0.742364
Effects Specification

Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Weighted Statistics
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.990111
0.987746
0.098027
418.6910
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Sum squared resid
Durbin-Watson stat

11.60342
3.888655
0.442026
1.193797

Unweighted Statistics
R-squared
Sum squared resid

0.969939
0.925465

Mean dependent var
Durbin-Watson stat

7.814564
1.834092

Gulf Subsample:
We follow the same methodology as described above. The equation remains the same, but we
exclude the dummy variable since the gulf countries did not experience the political event of the
Arab Spring that the North African countries witnessed. Thus, the equations for this sample is as
follows:
LGDP it = β0i+β1 LFDI it-1 + β2 LLABOR it + β3 CPI it + β4 GOV it + β5 LFDI it-1*CPI it + eit
After conducting the Hausman test, the results barely allows us to fail to reject the null
hypothesis, with a p-value of 0.0591. Thus, we default to the fixed effects model to estimate the
regression, considering its advantages as previously discussed.
Figure 4.2: FEM regression Output with cross-section weights

Dependent Variable: LGDP_?
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Method: Pooled EGLS (Cross-section weights)
Sample (adjusted): 2004 2013
Included observations: 10 after adjustments
Cross-sections included: 7
Total pool (unbalanced) observations: 61
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix
Variable

Coefficient

C
LLABOR_?
CPI_?
GOV_?
LFDI_?(-1)
CPI_?*LFDI_?(-1)
Fixed Effects
(Cross)
BAHRAIN--C
KUWAIT--C
OMAN--C
QATAR--C
SAUDIARABIA--C
UAE--C
YEMEN--C

11.80213
-0.144184
-0.007083
0.198478
-0.063261
0.014701

Std. Error

t-Statistic

0.588600 20.05119
0.036240 -3.978582
0.022475 -0.315142
0.085083 2.332765
0.038914 -1.625635
0.007581 1.939114

Prob.
0.0000
0.0002
0.7540
0.0238
0.1104
0.0583

-0.204183
0.637859
-0.349833
1.003619
0.204213
0.553182
-2.626802
Effects Specification

Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Weighted Statistics
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.995917
0.995000
0.094390
1086.490
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Sum squared resid
Durbin-Watson stat

14.47565
9.135991
0.436568
0.616274

Unweighted Statistics
R-squared
Sum squared resid

0.993097
0.532719

Mean dependent var
Durbin-Watson stat

9.744986
0.376447
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The regression results above indicate that all coefficients are statistically significant at the 5%
level, except that of the CPI, which is negative as in the first subsample This result also confirms
the theory that corruption has an insignificant impact on economic growth. Both CPI
and LFDI(-1) have a negative coefficient, however, the interactive variable indicates that their
combination generates a positive impact on growth, which could be interpreted that corruption
enhances the impact of foreign direct investment on economic growth.
As previously mentioned the FEM acknowledges the individuality of each cross-section and thus
allows heterogeneity. Nonetheless, the results might still be biased or inconsistent since the
variables might not be stationary throughout a time period. Macroeconomic variables, such as
those included in this study, might be trended, that is non-stationary and exhibit unit roots over
time. Thus, the implementation of a FEM on possibly non-stationary variables would lead to a
spurious regression. Thus, we will test for panel unit roots and find the order of integration of the
variables. What follows is a panel cointegration test, if the variables exhibit the same order of
integration, to determine if there is a long-term relationship among them.
1. Panel Unit Root Tests
Applying ordinary or generalized least squares approaches to non-stationary data can produce
spurious regressions which will lead to incorrect conclusions. High R-squared values, as those in
Figure 4.1, are a symptom of possible non-stationarity in the data. According to Asteriou and
Hall (2011, 335), a non-stationary series “has no long-run mean to which the series returns [after
a shock], and the variance will depend on time and will approach infinity as time goes to
infinity.” Thus, it is crucial to test for the presence of a unit root, that is non-stationarity.
Consider the following time series first autoregressive order AR(1) model,
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𝑌𝑡 = α 𝑌𝑡−1 + e𝑡,
where e𝑡 is a white noise process and the stationarity condition is |α| <1. Thus, a unit root is
present when α=1. In this case, substracting 𝑌𝑡−1 from both sides of the equation gives the
following:
𝑌𝑡 − 𝑌𝑡−1 = 𝑌𝑡−1 − 𝑌𝑡−1 + e𝑡
∆𝑌𝑡 = e𝑡
After differencing Yt, the series is rendered stationary since e𝑡 is a white noise process. It is
integrated of order one or I (1) because it became stationary in its first differenced form. Other
series might need to be integrated d times before they become stationary, hence they are said to
be integrated of order d.
Ramirez (2007, 349) mentions that panel unit root tests “are more powerful than unit root tests
applied to individual series because the information in the time series is enhanced by that
contained in the cross-section data. Moreover, individual unit root tests have complicated
limiting distributions while panel unit root tests provide statistics with a normal distribution in
the limit. This study uses two panel unit root tests. First, the Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC) test,
proposed in 1992 and published in 2002, extends the Augmented Dicky-Fuller test and develops
the following model,
∆𝑌𝑖𝑡 = γYit−1 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖L∆𝑌𝑖𝑡−L + 𝛼𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑚𝑡 + εit,
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 indicates the pooled variable, γ equals 𝜌 – 1 and is assumed to be fixed for all crosssections, 𝛼𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑚𝑡 indicate exogenous variables and εit indicates the “error terms assumed to be
mutually independent disturbances” (Ramirez, 2007). The null hypothesis is that γ equals zero
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which means that the variable is non-stationary, while the alternative hypothesis is that γ <0
which means the variable is stationary. The result of this test is uniform for all cross-section units
and does not consider cases where a series might be have a unit root for only some crosssections. Second, the Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) test (1997) allows individual unit root
processes, that is the coefficient of Yit−1 cross-section specific, as the following equation shows
by the subscript i:

∆𝑌𝑖𝑡 = γiYit−1 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖L∆𝑌𝑖𝑡−L + 𝛼𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑚𝑡 + εit,
The null hypothesis is that all series are non-stationary, that is exhibit a unit root, while the
alternative is that “a fraction of the series in the panel are assumed to be stationary” (Asteriou
and Hall, 2011, 444).

North Africa Subsample:
Based on the LLC test, all variables are stationary in level form, that is we reject the null
hypothesis of no-stationary at the 5% significance level. However, the IPS results offer
contradicting results since some values are above the 0.05 cut-off value, which does not allow us
to reject the null hypothesis. In the case of conflicting results by different tests, we conclude that
that there is a unit root, that is the variables are not stationary in level form. Thus, we conduct the
unit-root tests in first difference form. The IPS values become statistically significant at the 5%
level, and we can conclude that the variables are integrated of order one or I(1).

Gulf Subsample:
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Similar to the results obtained from the first sample, we reject the null hypothesis of nostationary at the 5% significance level and conclude that all variables are stationary in level
form based on the LLC test. However, the IPS results indicate that some values are above the
0.05 cut-off value, which does not allow us to reject the null hypothesis. We may conclude that
the variables are not stationary in level form. Thus, we conduct the unit-root tests in first
difference form. The IPS values become statistically significant at the 5% level, and we can
conclude that the variables are integrated of order one or I(1).

2. Panel Cointegration Analysis
Since the variables were not determined to be stationary, the FEM estimates for both subsamples generated spurious results. Thus, it is crucial to conduct a panel cointegration test to
determine the presence of an economic relationship between the non-stationary variables,
because “if the variables do not cointegrate we have problems of spurious regression and
econometric work becomes almost meaningless” (Asteriou and Hall, 2011, 356). For two nonstationary variables, cointegration exists when there is a linear combination of both variables that
is stationary. We consider the following model: 𝑌𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋 𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡, rewritten as
𝜇𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡 − 𝛽0 − 𝛽1𝑋 𝑡
to examine the behavior of the error term.
In the case that the variables and 𝑋 𝑡 are stationary, the error term 𝜇𝑡 would also be stationary
and exhibit a normal distribution. However, in the case that the variables are non-stationary, is
presented as a combination of two cumulated error processes, also known as stochastic trends. It
is most likely to also be non-stationary, expected to “wander around and eventually become
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large” (Asteriou and Hall, 2011, 341) which violates one of the classical assumptions that the
error term has a well-behaved distribution.
A special scenario which could result from the second case is when 𝑌𝑡 and 𝑋 are actually
related; thus, they move together and produce a combination that eliminates the non-stationarity,
due to the two stochastic trends being similar. Thus, even though the variables are trended, there
is a common trend which links them together which indicates a genuine long-run relationship
and cointegration.
To test for cointegration in panel data, we use the Pedroni methodology which follows the model
below:
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 +∑𝑀
𝑚=1

+ 𝛽𝑚𝑖𝑋𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡.

This method allows for multiple regressors, indicated by the values of m, starting at 1 and up to
M, as well as for both heterogeneity in the errors and the cointegration vector to vary across the
cross-sectional units. The test includes seven cointegration statistics divided into two categories.
The first category consists of four panel statistics based on pooling the “within” dimension, that
is “pooling the AR coefficients across different sections of the panel for the unit-root on the
residuals”. The second one consists of three group statistics based on pooling the “between”
dimension, that is “averaging the AR coefficients for each member of the panel for the unit-root
test on the residuals” (Asteriou and Hall, 2011, 451). The null hypothesis is that there is no
cointegration, while the alternative is that cointegration is present in the model. If cointegration
was found through the panel statistics, then the examined variables are cointegrated for all crosssections, and if cointegration was found through the group statistics, then the variables are
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cointegrated for at least one cross-section. The results of both samples are summarized in the
below figure 4.2.
For the North Africa subsample, both panel PP and ADF statistics, as well as the group PP
statistic allow us to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 5% significance level.
We may conclude that there is a long-run equilibrium relationship between the variables in this
panel.
For the Gulf Subsample, both panel and group PP and ADF statistics, lead us to reject the null
hypothesis of no cointegration at the 5% significance level. We may conclude that there is a
long-run equilibrium relationship between the variables in this panel.

Figure 4.2: Summary of Pedroni Cointegration Test Results
North Africa Subsample
Panel
Group
v-statistic
rho-statistic
PP-statistic
ADF-statistic

-1.669569
2.120684
-18.85271*
-3.695940*

3.180448
-8.626157*
2.969242

Gulf Subsample
Panel
Group
13.75239
2.343995
-11.09256*
-6.047468*

3.549039
-10.58249*
-5.997332*

*Statistically Significant at the 5% level

FMOLS Results
We re-estimate the following equation for each panel and obtain contradicting results for
each region. Thus, the impact of corruption depends on the area. For the Gulf sample, corruption
seems to enhance economic growth, possibly due to the country’s dependence on its natural
resources. Thus, corruption is a tool to oil the bureaucratic wheel and encourage investments. On
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the other hand, corruption seems to harm economic growth in the North-Africa sample, possibly
due to institutional factors, beyond the scope of this thesis.

5. Conclusion
This thesis has explored and empirically estimated the impact of corruption on economic
growth in two samples in the Middle East and North Africa during the years of 2003 to 2013.
Both samples of North Africa and the Gulf were grouped based on political events, respectively
the Arab spring and the invasion of Iraq, which impacted each set of countries differently.
Moreover, the variation in corruption levels within MENA suggests that the region is best
analyzed in subsamples to control for such a difference. Using the fixed effects least-squares
dummy variable model (FEM), both estimated regressions indicated that the coefficient of the
corruption variable (CPI) has a negative but statistically insignificant relationship with economic
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growth, proxied by real per capita gross domestic product. This finding confirms the group of
scholars who argue that corruption does not have a significant impact on growth, and disputes
the majoritarian theory that corruption hinders economic growth mainly through foreign
investment.
However, FEM estimates, if applied to non-stationary data, can generate spurious
regressions as well as biased and inconsistent results. Thus, we tested for the presence of unit
roots in each series by employing two panel unit root tests. Both the Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC)
and the Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) tests indicated that the variables were integrated of order one.
After we found stationarity in the first difference form, we tested for panel cointegration to
determine if there exists a long-run relationship between the variables in question, which
validates applying FEM to non-stationary variables. The Pedroni cointegration test, through ADF
and PP statistics found evidence in both samples that there is panel cointegration in the model.
However, applying OLS estimates are biased when applied to cointegrated panels; hence, the
next step will include a regression using the Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares (FMOLS).
This method “not only generates consistent estimates of the β parameters in relatively small
samples, but it controls for the likely endogeneity of the regressors and serial correlation”
(Ramirez, 2007, 352).
This thesis has several limitations. First, the relatively short time frame might undermine
the robustness of the results; this issue is related to the lack of data for many MENA countries,
especially regarding the Corruption Perceptions Index, which despite its launch in 1995, did not
cover many of the region’s countries until 2003. Another potential issue is the reliance on
interpolating data to generate missing values, which weakens the credibility of the data used in
the empirical model. Evidently, the main issue remains with the inaccurate and imperfect
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measurement of corruption. In fact, critics of the Corruption Perceptions Index argue that the
reliance on the opinions of small group of experts and businesspeople “embeds a powerful and
misleading elite bias in popular perceptions of corruption” (The Guardian, 2013).
This thesis attempted to offer a contribution to the two previous studies regarding the
relationship between corruption and growth in the MENA region. And while one study found a
positive impact of corruption on growth, the other found the opposite relationship. Our study
now presents a third hypothesis, that corruption does not have a significant impact on economic
growth in a selection of MENA countries. This finding allows us to question whether corruption
should be the focus of World Bank initiatives, and whether resources would be optimally utilized
in other programs to enhance economic growth.

Appendix A. Descriptive Statistics
North Africa Subsample:
LGDP_?
7.844902
Mean
8.041059
Median
Maximum 9.121849
Minimum 6.483211
0.727080
Std. Dev.
Skewness -0.070939
2.352677
Kurtosis

LLABOR_? LFDI_?
15.53078
1.127016
15.65153
1.026293
17.18189
3.618136
13.73344
-0.308838
1.044570
0.899261
-0.144161
0.849489
1.809670
3.392417

CPI_?
3.191071
3.100000
5.000000
1.500000
0.706664
0.485927
3.339187

LFDI_?(1)*CPI_?
3.298717
3.337963
11.21622
-4.002430
2.977101
0.403020
3.310124

GOV_?
-0.453519
-0.452205
0.577048
-1.489980
0.511210
-0.008506
2.435197

D1_?
0.089286
0.000000
1.000000
0.000000
0.287736
2.880632
9.298039

Jarque1.024698
Bera
Probability 0.599087

3.500035
0.173771

2.472281
0.290503

1.740377
0.418873

0.745015
0.689005

170.0007
0.000000

7.094545
0.028803
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Sum
Sum Sq.
Dev.

439.3145

869.7237

63.11290

178.7000

184.7282

-25.39707

5.000000

29.07546

60.01193

44.47690

27.46554

487.4722

14.37348

4.553571

56

56

56

56

56

56

6

6

6

6

6

6

Observatio
56
ns
Cross
6
sections
Gulf Subsample:

LLABOR_? CPI_?
14.51610
5.078689
14.25436
5.100000
16.27944
7.700000
12.85429
2.100000
1.021219
1.319737
0.243140 -0.527774
1.744583
2.950544

GOV_?
0.297017
0.407091
1.167206
-1.130834
0.556357
-0.886596
3.574101

LFDI_?(-1)
0.835041
1.230419
2.756879
-3.219854
1.265402
-1.336709
4.319055

LFDI_?(1)*CPI_?
4.467880
5.375577
16.30225
-15.13331
6.726659
-1.082128
3.920712

Jarque-Bera 46.93098
Probability 0.000000

4.606869
0.099915

2.838094
0.241945

8.829242
0.012099

22.58796
0.000012

14.05978
0.000885

594.4441
Sum
Sum Sq. Dev. 77.17717

885.4820
62.57332

309.8000
104.5023

18.11802
18.57197

50.93752
96.07455

272.5407
2714.876

Observations 61
Cross
7
sections

61

61

61

61

61

7

7

7

7

7

Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Skewness
Kurtosis

LGDP_?
9.744986
9.794511
11.03712
6.551587
1.134146
-1.722556
5.568239
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Appendix B. Regressions
North Africa Subsample:

Dependent Variable: LGDP_?
Method: Pooled EGLS (Cross-section weights)
Sample (adjusted): 2004 2013
Included observations: 10 after adjustments
Cross-sections included: 6
Total pool (unbalanced) observations: 58
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected)
Variable

Coefficient

C
LLABOR_?
LFDI_?(-1)

-7.093367
0.966009
-0.046890

Std. Error

t-Statistic

1.992740 -3.559605
0.133983 7.209911
0.059666 -0.785889

Prob.
0.0009
0.0000
0.4360
44

CPI_?
LFDI_?(-1)*CPI_?
GOV_?
D1_?
Fixed Effects
(Cross)
ALGERIA--C
EGYPT--C
LIBYA--C
MAURITANIA--C
MOROCCO--C
TUNISIA--C

-0.027655
0.018652
0.039575
-0.013801

0.026855 -1.029806
0.019339 0.964457
0.046359 0.853671
0.009791 -1.409488

0.3085
0.3399
0.3977
0.1654

-0.392164
-2.087691
1.972872
0.427129
-0.828567
0.742364
Effects Specification

Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Weighted Statistics
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.990111
0.987746
0.098027
418.6910
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Sum squared resid
Durbin-Watson stat

11.60342
3.888655
0.442026
1.193797

Unweighted Statistics
R-squared
Sum squared resid

0.969939
0.925465

Mean dependent var
Durbin-Watson stat

7.814564
1.834092

Gulf Subsample:
Dependent Variable: LGDP_?
Method: Pooled EGLS (Cross-section weights)
Sample (adjusted): 2004 2013
Included observations: 10 after adjustments
Cross-sections included: 7
Total pool (unbalanced) observations: 61
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix
Variable

Coefficient

C
LLABOR_?
CPI_?
GOV_?

11.80213
-0.144184
-0.007083
0.198478

Std. Error

t-Statistic

0.588600 20.05119
0.036240 -3.978582
0.022475 -0.315142
0.085083 2.332765

Prob.
0.0000
0.0002
0.7540
0.0238
45

LFDI_?(-1)
CPI_?*LFDI_?(-1)
Fixed Effects
(Cross)
BAHRAIN--C
KUWAIT--C
OMAN--C
QATAR--C
SAUDIARABIA--C
UAE--C
YEMEN--C

-0.063261
0.014701

0.038914 -1.625635
0.007581 1.939114

0.1104
0.0583

-0.204183
0.637859
-0.349833
1.003619
0.204213
0.553182
-2.626802
Effects Specification

Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
Weighted Statistics
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.995917
0.995000
0.094390
1086.490
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Sum squared resid
Durbin-Watson stat

14.47565
9.135991
0.436568
0.616274

Unweighted Statistics
R-squared
Sum squared resid

0.993097
0.532719

Mean dependent var
Durbin-Watson stat

9.744986
0.376447

Appendix C. Hausman Test
Gulf Subsample:
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test
Pool: COUN
Test cross-section random effects
Chi-Sq.
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f.

Test Summary
Cross-section random

3.681560

Prob.

5 0.05961

Cross-section random effects test comparisons:
Variable

Fixed

Random Var(Diff.)

Prob.
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LLABOR_?
CPI_?
GOV_?
LFDI_?(-1)
(CPI_?*LFDI_?(-1))

-0.219688 -0.228220
-0.000309 -0.000818
0.173979 0.203980
-0.060285 -0.061875
0.012602 0.013108

0.000056
0.000000
0.000348
0.000002
0.000000

0.2551
0.4427
0.1077
0.2036
0.1284

t-Statistic

Prob.

Cross-section random effects test equation:
Dependent Variable: LGDP_?
Method: Panel Least Squares
Sample (adjusted): 2004 2013
Included observations: 10 after adjustments
Cross-sections included: 7
Total pool (unbalanced) observations: 61
Variable

Coefficient

C
12.87793
LLABOR_?
-0.219688
CPI_?
-0.000309
GOV_?
0.173979
LFDI_?(-1)
-0.060285
CPI_?*LFDI_?(-1) 0.012602

Std. Error

0.793575 16.22774
0.053765 -4.086113
0.036069 -0.008578
0.138141 1.259433
0.052652 -1.144970
0.010021 1.257583

0.0000
0.0002
0.9932
0.2138
0.2578
0.2145

Effects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.993471
0.992006
0.101405
0.503866
59.73246
677.8480
0.000000

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

9.744986
1.134146
-1.564999
-1.149745
-1.402257
0.384786
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Appendix D. Panel Unit Root Tests
North Africa Subsample:
Pool unit root test: Summary
Series: LGDP_ALGERIA, LGDP_EGYPT, LGDP_LIBYA,
LGDP_MAURITANIA
, LGDP_MOROCCO, LGDP_TUNISIA
Sample: 2003 2013
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
CrossMethod
Statistic Prob.** sections
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t*
-4.41811 0.0000
6

Obs
58
48

Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin Wstat
-2.14482 0.0160
6
ADF - Fisher Chi-square
23.4913 0.0238
6
PP - Fisher Chi-square
30.2673 0.0025
6

58
58
60

** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic
Chi
-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic
normality.

Pool unit root test: Summary
Series: LGDP_ALGERIA, LGDP_EGYPT, LGDP_LIBYA,
LGDP_MAURITANIA
, LGDP_MOROCCO, LGDP_TUNISIA
Sample: 2003 2013
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
Balanced observations for each test
CrossMethod
Statistic Prob.** sections
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t*
-6.03657 0.0000
6
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin Wstat
-3.62894 0.0001
6
ADF - Fisher Chi-square
36.5728 0.0003
6
PP - Fisher Chi-square
49.0702 0.0000
6

Obs
54

54
54
54

** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic
Chi
-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic
normality.

Pool unit root test: Summary
Series: LLABOR_ALGERIA, LLABOR_EGYPT,
LLABOR_LIBYA,
49

LLABOR_MAURITANIA, LLABOR_MOROCCO,
LLABOR_TUNISIA
Sample: 2003 2013
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
CrossMethod
Statistic Prob.** sections
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t*
-2.11920 0.0170
6
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin Wstat
0.68176 0.7523
6
ADF - Fisher Chi-square
7.43509 0.8276
6
PP - Fisher Chi-square
23.3958 0.0245
6

Obs
56

56
56
60

** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic
Chi
-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic
normality.

Pool unit root test: Summary
Series: LLABOR_ALGERIA, LLABOR_EGYPT,
LLABOR_LIBYA,
LLABOR_MAURITANIA, LLABOR_MOROCCO,
LLABOR_TUNISIA
Sample: 2003 2013
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
CrossMethod
Statistic Prob.** sections
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t*
-1.52664 0.0634
6
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin Wstat
-2.49763 0.0063
6
ADF - Fisher Chi-square
30.7727 0.0021
6

Obs
53

53
53
50

PP - Fisher Chi-square

28.7530

0.0043

6

54

** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic
Chi
-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic
normality.

Pool unit root test: Summary
Series: LFDI_ALGERIA, LFDI_EGYPT, LFDI_LIBYA,
LFDI_MAURITANIA,
LFDI_MOROCCO, LFDI_TUNISIA
Sample: 2003 2013
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
CrossMethod
Statistic Prob.** sections
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t*
-6.24232 0.0000
6
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin Wstat
-2.72005 0.0033
6
ADF - Fisher Chi-square
28.3573 0.0049
6
PP - Fisher Chi-square
23.3063 0.0252
6

Obs
48

48
48
50

** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic
Chi
-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic
normality.

Pool unit root test: Summary
Series: LFDI_ALGERIA, LFDI_EGYPT, LFDI_LIBYA,
LFDI_MAURITANIA,
LFDI_MOROCCO, LFDI_TUNISIA
Sample: 2003 2013
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0
51

Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
CrossMethod
Statistic Prob.** sections
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t*
-4.41426 0.0000
6
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin Wstat
-2.90444 0.0018
6
ADF - Fisher Chi-square
33.0145 0.0010
6
PP - Fisher Chi-square
33.4418 0.0008
6

Obs
48

48
48
48

** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic
Chi
-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic
normality.

Pool unit root test: Summary
Series: CPI_ALGERIA, CPI_EGYPT, CPI_LIBYA,
CPI_MAURITANIA,
CPI_MOROCCO, CPI_TUNISIA
Sample: 2003 2013
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
Balanced observations for each test
CrossMethod
Statistic Prob.** sections
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t*
-2.55079 0.0054
6
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin Wstat
-0.45081 0.3261
6
ADF - Fisher Chi-square
16.0518 0.1889
6
PP - Fisher Chi-square
15.4435 0.2181
6

Obs
60

60
60
60

Pool unit root test: Summary
Series: CPI_ALGERIA, CPI_EGYPT, CPI_LIBYA,
CPI_MAURITANIA,
52

CPI_MOROCCO, CPI_TUNISIA
Sample: 2003 2013
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
Balanced observations for each test
CrossMethod
Statistic Prob.** sections
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t*
-8.15274 0.0000
6
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin Wstat
-4.48968 0.0000
6
ADF - Fisher Chi-square
42.6625 0.0000
6
PP - Fisher Chi-square
49.8232 0.0000
6

Obs
54

54
54
54

** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic
Chi
-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic
normality.

Pool unit root test: Summary
Series: GOV_ALGERIA, GOV_EGYPT, GOV_LIBYA,
GOV_MAURITANIA,
GOV_MOROCCO, GOV_TUNISIA
Sample: 2003 2013
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
CrossMethod
Statistic Prob.** sections
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t*
-1.76605 0.0387
6
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin Wstat
-0.26604 0.3951
6
ADF - Fisher Chi-square
13.9954 0.3010
6

Obs
57

57
57
53

PP - Fisher Chi-square

20.4884

0.0584

6

60

** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic
Chi
-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic
normality.

Pool unit root test: Summary
Series: GOV_ALGERIA, GOV_EGYPT, GOV_LIBYA,
GOV_MAURITANIA,
GOV_MOROCCO, GOV_TUNISIA
Sample: 2003 2013
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
CrossMethod
Statistic Prob.** sections
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t*
-5.48075 0.0000
6
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin Wstat
-2.63752 0.0042
6
ADF - Fisher Chi-square
29.2036 0.0037
6
PP - Fisher Chi-square
45.1535 0.0000
6

Obs
52

52
52
54

** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic
Chi
-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic
normality.

Pool unit root test: Summary
Series: LFDI_ALGERIA(-1)*CPI_ALGERIA, LFDI_EGYPT(1)*CPI_EGYPT,
LFDI_LIBYA(-1)*CPI_LIBYA, LFDI_MAURITANIA(1)*CPI_MAURITANIA,
LFDI_MOROCCO(-1)*CPI_MOROCCO,
LFDI_TUNISIA(-1)
*CPI_TUNISIA
Sample: 2003 2013
54

Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
CrossMethod
Statistic Prob.** sections
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t*
-2.19496 0.0141
6
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin Wstat
-1.58245 0.0568
6
ADF - Fisher Chi-square
20.9871 0.0506
6
PP - Fisher Chi-square
22.3305 0.0340
6

Obs
48

48
48
50

** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic
Chi
-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic
normality.

Pool unit root test: Summary
Series: LFDI_ALGERIA(-1)*CPI_ALGERIA, LFDI_EGYPT(1)*CPI_EGYPT,
LFDI_LIBYA(-1)*CPI_LIBYA, LFDI_MAURITANIA(1)*CPI_MAURITANIA,
LFDI_MOROCCO(-1)*CPI_MOROCCO, LFDI_TUNISIA(1)
*CPI_TUNISIA
Sample: 2003 2013
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
CrossMethod
Statistic Prob.** sections
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t*
-3.78273 0.0001
6
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin Wstat
-1.75228 0.0399
6
ADF - Fisher Chi-square
23.9269 0.0208
6
PP - Fisher Chi-square
26.4538 0.0093
6

Obs
43

43
43
43
55

** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic
Chi
-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic
normality.

Gulf Subsample:

Pool unit root test: Summary
Series: LGDP_BAHRAIN, LGDP_KUWAIT, LGDP_OMAN,
LGDP_QATAR,
LGDP_SAUDIARABIA, LGDP_UAE, LGDP_YEMEN
Sample: 2003 2013
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
CrossMethod
Statistic Prob.** sections
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t*
-2.44961 0.0072
7
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin Wstat
0.23551 0.5931
7
ADF - Fisher Chi-square
11.3064 0.6618
7
PP - Fisher Chi-square
16.8578 0.2638
7

Obs
65

65
65
70

** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic
Chi
-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic
normality.

Pool unit root test: Summary
Series: LGDP_BAHRAIN, LGDP_KUWAIT, LGDP_OMAN,
LGDP_QATAR,
LGDP_SAUDIARABIA, LGDP_UAE, LGDP_YEMEN
Sample: 2003 2013
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1
56

Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
CrossMethod
Statistic Prob.** sections
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t*
-8.71679 0.0000
7
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin Wstat
-4.39728 0.0000
7
ADF - Fisher Chi-square
46.7043 0.0000
7
PP - Fisher Chi-square
54.0617 0.0000
7

Obs
62

62
62
63

** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic
Chi
-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic
normality.

Pool unit root test: Summary
Series: CPI_BAHRAIN, CPI_KUWAIT, CPI_OMAN,
CPI_QATAR,
CPI_SAUDIARABIA, CPI_UAE, CPI_YEMEN
Sample: 2003 2013
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
CrossMethod
Statistic Prob.** sections
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t*
-1.84137 0.0328
7
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin Wstat
0.42509 0.6646
7
ADF - Fisher Chi-square
9.57175 0.7928
7
PP - Fisher Chi-square
10.6422 0.7139
7

Obs
68

68
68
70

** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic
Chi
-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic
normality.

57

Pool unit root test: Summary
Series: CPI_BAHRAIN, CPI_KUWAIT, CPI_OMAN,
CPI_QATAR,
CPI_SAUDIARABIA, CPI_UAE, CPI_YEMEN
Sample: 2003 2013
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
CrossMethod
Statistic Prob.** sections
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t*
-6.68288 0.0000
7
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin Wstat
-4.41795 0.0000
7
ADF - Fisher Chi-square
47.4929 0.0000
7
PP - Fisher Chi-square
78.8012 0.0000
7

Obs
61

61
61
63

** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic
Chi
-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic
normality.

Pool unit root test: Summary
Series: LFDI_BAHRAIN, LFDI_KUWAIT, LFDI_OMAN,
LFDI_QATAR,
LFDI_SAUDIARABIA, LFDI_UAE, LFDI_YEMEN
Date: 04/07/16 Time: 06:13
Sample: 2003 2013
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
CrossMethod
Statistic Prob.** sections
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t*
-2.98328 0.0014
7
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin Wstat
-0.98781 0.1616
7

Obs
49

49
58

ADF - Fisher Chi-square
PP - Fisher Chi-square

20.1806
20.4444

0.1245
0.1167

7
7

49
51

** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic
Chi
-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic
normality.

Pool unit root test: Summary
Series: LFDI_BAHRAIN, LFDI_KUWAIT, LFDI_OMAN,
LFDI_QATAR,
LFDI_SAUDIARABIA, LFDI_UAE, LFDI_YEMEN
Sample: 2003 2013
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
CrossMethod
Statistic Prob.** sections
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t*
-8.61503 0.0000
7
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin Wstat
-4.18991 0.0000
6
ADF - Fisher Chi-square
38.7690 0.0004
7
PP - Fisher Chi-square
31.7460 0.0044
7

Obs
42

39
42
43

** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic
Chi
-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic
normality.

Pool unit root test: Summary
Series: GOV_BAHRAIN, GOV_KUWAIT, GOV_OMAN,
GOV_QATAR,
GOV_SAUDIARABIA, GOV_UAE, GOV_YEMEN
Sample: 2003 2013
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1
59

Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
CrossMethod
Statistic Prob.** sections
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t*
-1.79453 0.0364
7
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin Wstat
0.02230 0.5089
7
ADF - Fisher Chi-square
11.5841 0.6397
7
PP - Fisher Chi-square
8.72334 0.8484
7

Obs
67

67
67
70

** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic
Chi
-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic
normality.

Pool unit root test: Summary
Series: GOV_BAHRAIN, GOV_KUWAIT, GOV_OMAN,
GOV_QATAR,
GOV_SAUDIARABIA, GOV_UAE, GOV_YEMEN
Sample: 2003 2013
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
CrossMethod
Statistic Prob.** sections
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t*
-11.3485 0.0000
7
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin Wstat
-5.88781 0.0000
7
ADF - Fisher Chi-square
59.8349 0.0000
7
PP - Fisher Chi-square
72.2250 0.0000
7

Obs
61

61
61
63

** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic
Chi
-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic
normality.
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Pool unit root test: Summary
Series: LFDI_BAHRAIN(-1)*CPI_BAHRAIN,
LFDI_KUWAIT(-1)
*CPI_KUWAIT, LFDI_OMAN(-1)*CPI_OMAN,
LFDI_QATAR(-1)
*CPI_QATAR, LFDI_SAUDIARABIA(1)*CPI_SAUDIARABIA, LFDI_UAE(
-1)*CPI_UAE, LFDI_YEMEN(-1)*CPI_YEMEN
Sample: 2003 2013
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
CrossMethod
Statistic Prob.** sections
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t*
-3.08507 0.0010
7
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin Wstat
-0.55805 0.2884
7
ADF - Fisher Chi-square
16.2991 0.2955
7
PP - Fisher Chi-square
14.7268 0.3971
7

Obs
49

49
49
51

** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic
Chi
-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic
normality.

Pool unit root test: Summary
Series: LFDI_BAHRAIN(-1)*CPI_BAHRAIN,
LFDI_KUWAIT(-1)
*CPI_KUWAIT, LFDI_OMAN(-1)*CPI_OMAN,
LFDI_QATAR(-1)
*CPI_QATAR, LFDI_SAUDIARABIA(1)*CPI_SAUDIARABIA, LFDI_UAE(
-1)*CPI_UAE, LFDI_YEMEN(-1)*CPI_YEMEN
Sample: 2003 2013
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
61

CrossMethod
Statistic Prob.** sections
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t*
-8.69485 0.0000
7
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin Wstat
-4.70643 0.0000
6
ADF - Fisher Chi-square
41.9200 0.0001
7
PP - Fisher Chi-square
40.1969 0.0002
7

Obs
42

39
42
43

** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic
Chi
-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic
normality.

Appendix E. Cointegration Tests
North Africa Subsample:

Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test
Series: LGDP_? LLABOR_? LFDI_? CPI_? LFDI_?(-1)*CPI_?
GOV_?
Sample: 2003 2013
Included observations: 11
Cross-sections included: 6
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration
Trend assumption: No deterministic trend
User-specified lag length: 1
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs. (within-dimension)
Weighted
62

Panel v-Statistic
Panel rho-Statistic
Panel PP-Statistic
Panel ADF-Statistic

Statistic
-1.669569
2.120684
-18.85271
-3.695940

Prob.
0.9525
0.9830
0.0000
0.0001

Statistic
-3.531631
2.250359
-12.00899
-2.396103

Prob.
0.9998
0.9878
0.0000
0.0083

Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs. (betweendimension)
Statistic
Group rho-Statistic
3.180448
Group PP-Statistic -8.626157
Group ADF-Statistic 2.969242

Prob.
0.9993
0.0000
0.9985

Cross section specific results
Phillips-Peron results (non-parametric)
Cross ID
ALGERIA
EGYPT
LIBYA
MAURITANI
A
MOROCCO
TUNISIA

AR(1)
-0.594
-0.724
-0.520

Variance
HAC Bandwidth
1.90E-05 2.55E-05
1.00
1.43E-05 3.39E-06
5.00
0.038115 0.005303
7.00

-0.508 0.000104 0.000122
0.364 0.000453 0.000453
-0.339 9.89E-05 9.89E-05

Obs
9
6
9

1.00
0.00
0.00

6
9
9

Augmented Dickey-Fuller results (parametric)
Cross ID
ALGERIA
EGYPT
LIBYA
MAURITANI
A
MOROCCO
TUNISIA

AR(1)
-0.073
-2.444
-1.637

Variance
1.44E-05
8.05E-06
0.026797

Lag
1
1
1

Max lag
----

Obs
8
5
8

1.438 0.000105
0.017 0.000378
-0.089 0.000107

1
1
1

----

4
8
8

Gulf Subsample:
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Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test
Series: LGDP_? LLABOR_? CPI_? LFDI_?(-1)
GOV_?
Date: 04/07/16 Time: 06:22
Sample: 2003 2013
Included observations: 11
Cross-sections included: 7
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration
Trend assumption: Deterministic intercept and trend
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC with lags from -1 to
0
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs. (within-dimension)
Weighted
Statistic
Prob.
Statistic Prob.
Panel v-Statistic
13.75239 0.0000 -4.795514 1.0000
Panel rho-Statistic
2.343995 0.9905 3.325080 0.9996
-11.09256 0.0000 0.057226 0.5228
Panel PP-Statistic
Panel ADF-Statistic -6.047468 0.0000 0.216203 0.5856
Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs. (betweendimension)
Statistic
Group rho-Statistic
3.549039
Group PP-Statistic -10.58249
Group ADF-Statistic -5.997332

Prob.
0.9998
0.0000
0.0000

Cross section specific results
Phillips-Peron results (non-parametric)
Cross ID
BAHRAIN
KUWAIT
OMAN
QATAR
SAUDIARA
BIA
UAE
YEMEN

AR(1)
-0.601
-0.324
-0.500
-0.272

Variance
4.52E-05
2.26E-05
4.64E-05
4.47E-05

HAC Bandwidth
3.74E-05
2.00
1.53E-05
5.00
7.66E-06
6.00
4.11E-05
1.00

-0.779 2.58E-06 2.47E-06
-0.527 0.000203 4.46E-05
-0.552 1.15E-20 9.24E-21

Obs
9
6
9
7

2.00
5.00
1.00

7
9
4

Max lag

Obs

Augmented Dickey-Fuller results (parametric)
Cross ID

AR(1) Variance

Lag
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BAHRAIN
KUWAIT
OMAN
QATAR
SAUDIARA
BIA
UAE
YEMEN

-0.601
-0.324
-0.500
-0.272

4.52E-05
2.26E-05
4.64E-05
4.47E-05

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

9
6
9
7

-0.779 2.58E-06
-0.527 0.000203
-0.552 1.15E-20

0
0
0

0
0
-1

7
9
4

SUB1:

Dependent Variable: LGDP
Method: Panel Fully Modified Least Squares (FMOLS)
Date: 05/03/16 Time: 18:34
Sample (adjusted): 2004 2013
Periods included: 10
Cross-sections included: 5
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 48
Panel method: Weighted estimation
Cointegrating equation deterministics: C
Long-run covariance estimates (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed
bandwidth)
Warning: one more more cross-sections have been dropped due to
estimation errors
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

LLABOR
CPI
LFDI
GOV
CPI*LFDI
D1

1.140462
-1.283247
0.263518
1.251074
-0.556294
-1.266276

0.060621
0.107046
0.082428
0.105697
0.057353
0.125475

18.81287
-11.98782
3.196948
11.83640
-9.699459
-10.09189

0.0000
0.0000
0.0029
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared

-0.726707
-1.254313

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var

7.953120
0.730507
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S.E. of regression
Long-run variance

1.096810
0.003141

Sum squared resid

43.30768

Dependent Variable: LGDP
Method: Panel Fully Modified Least Squares (FMOLS)
Date: 05/03/16 Time: 18:32
Sample (adjusted): 2004 2013
Periods included: 10
Cross-sections included: 6
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 56
Panel method: Weighted estimation
Cointegrating equation deterministics: C
Long-run covariance estimates (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed
bandwidth)
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

LLABOR
CPI
LFDI
GOV
CPI*LFDI

1.084638
-0.277516
-0.456371
0.204477
-0.176380

0.029986
0.073574
0.026342
0.025971
0.021589

36.17143
-3.771939
-17.32473
7.873159
-8.169987

0.0000
0.0005
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Long-run variance

0.248116
0.081031
0.696999
0.007450

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Sum squared resid

7.844902
0.727080
21.86137

Dependent Variable: LGDP
Method: Panel Fully Modified Least Squares (FMOLS)
Date: 05/03/16 Time: 18:35
Sample (adjusted): 2004 2013
Periods included: 10
Cross-sections included: 5
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 48
Panel method: Weighted estimation
Cointegrating equation deterministics: C
Long-run covariance estimates (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed
bandwidth)
Warning: one more more cross-sections have been dropped due to
estimation errors
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

LLABOR
CPI
LFDI
GOV
D1

1.846187
-1.227865
-0.114780
0.422206
0.241022

0.063960
0.124887
0.039887
0.036989
0.057572

28.86476
-9.831788
-2.877666
11.41433
4.186485

0.0000
0.0000
0.0066
0.0000
0.0002

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression

0.613517
0.509063
0.511844

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Sum squared resid

7.953120
0.730507
9.693403
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Long-run variance

0.003266

SUB2:
Dependent Variable: LGDP
Method: Panel Fully Modified Least Squares (FMOLS)
Date: 05/03/16 Time: 18:37
Sample (adjusted): 2004 2013
Periods included: 10
Cross-sections included: 6
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 52
Panel method: Weighted estimation
Cointegrating equation deterministics: C
Long-run covariance estimates (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed
bandwidth)
Warning: one more more cross-sections have been dropped due to
estimation errors
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

LLABOR
CPI
GOV
LFDI
CPI*LFDI

-0.365750
0.400715
0.121890
0.106699
0.303099

0.040039
0.136299
0.148324
0.072192
0.027219

-9.134859
2.939976
0.821780
1.477997
11.13542

0.0000
0.0054
0.4161
0.1472
0.0000

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Long-run variance

-6.066744
-8.010098
1.526691
0.001868

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Sum squared resid

10.03350
0.508612
93.23145

Dependent Variable: LGDP
Method: Panel Fully Modified Least Squares (FMOLS)
Date: 05/03/16 Time: 18:37
Sample (adjusted): 2004 2013
Periods included: 10
Cross-sections included: 6
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 52
Panel method: Weighted estimation
Cointegrating equation deterministics: C
Long-run covariance estimates (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed
bandwidth)
Warning: one more more cross-sections have been dropped due to
estimation errors
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

LLABOR
CPI
GOV
LFDI

-0.156224
0.358581
-0.230213
0.068519

0.035546
0.117827
0.142467
0.068263

-4.394968
3.043274
-1.615909
1.003746

0.0001
0.0041
0.1138
0.3214

R-squared

0.862902

Mean dependent var

10.03350
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Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Long-run variance

0.829464
0.210037
0.002892

S.D. dependent var
Sum squared resid

0.508612
1.808732
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